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    CryptoStrapon Investigation: fake airdrops and drainer kits
    High
    Airdrop Fraud

    Fake Airdrops: How a Claim Page Drains a Wallet

    Published: Last updated: Editorial policy
    16 min read

    A free token. A 'Claim' button. A signature that hands over the wallet.

    The Scheme: Phishing-as-a-Service

    A fake airdrop is usually a rented product. Group-IB described how Inferno Drainer, active from November 2022 until its announced shutdown in November 2023, was sold to other criminals as scam-as-a-service: the developers charged a flat 20% of stolen assets, the users kept 80%, and buyers could load the drainer on their own phishing sites or use the developers' hosting. Group-IB found more than 100 impersonated crypto brands on more than 16,000 domains. The kit author keeps a fifth. The operator keeps the rest. The victim pays for both.

    You didn't get scammed by a hacker. You got scammed by a subscription business.

    Fake airdrops are a rented business. Group-IB documented a drainer kit whose developers took 20% of every theft while the operators kept 80%. ScamSniffer counted $83.85 million in signature-phishing losses across 106,106 victims in 2025, a total that covers every kind of malicious signature, airdrop pages included. The victims clicked a button that said 'Claim'. They got nothing back. They got everything taken instead.

    Case File Update

    Sourcing correction: removed figures we could not trace to a primary source ($100M, 18,200 wallets, 47 campaigns, average and largest losses, 73% and 0.4% rates, kit prices, ad click rates, blocklist sizes and coverage); corrected the Permit2 expiry claim; based the drainer-kit model on Group-IB's Inferno Drainer research and the totals on ScamSniffer's 2025 report; labelled scenes and examples as illustrative; replaced homepage sources with exact pages.

    Earlier history
    • First published.

    The Hard Truth: 'Free Money' Was the Bait. The Signature Was the Trap.

    Illustrative scene, not a documented case: a DeFi user sees a post about an 'airdrop' from a project he follows. The page looks right. The wallet popup looks like every approval he has signed before. He clicks Claim. Soon after, his stablecoins leave the wallet.

    He doesn't have to be careless. He has signed so many approvals that never hurt him that he stopped reading the spender field. Muscle memory is what the drainer kit is built to exploit.

    Fake claim pages borrow the names of real or expected token launches, because that's where people expect free tokens. The difference is in what you sign. A real claim sends tokens to you. A fake one asks you to approve or permit someone else to spend tokens you already hold. The button said 'Claim'. The signature said 'Drain'.

    It's not a hack. It's not a bug. It's a business — and you signed the receipt.

    The Criminal Machine: Kit Author, Operator, Victim

    The model Group-IB described has three parties. The kit developer maintains the drainer and a customer panel showing connected wallets, confirmed transactions and stolen value. The operator runs the phishing page and brings the traffic. The victim signs. Inferno Drainer's developers promoted it on a Telegram channel whose first post dates to 5 November 2022. The kit author gets paid on every theft. The operator does the legwork. The victim funds the whole arrangement.

    Scale is where numbers get slippery, so here are the ones with a source. Group-IB, citing ScamSniffer, links Inferno Drainer to more than $80 million in stolen assets, the most prominent drainer of 2023. ScamSniffer's 2025 report counts $83.85 million in signature-phishing losses across 106,106 victims on EVM chains, with Permit the leading signature type. Both totals cover drainer and signature phishing in general, not fake airdrops alone. A smaller number is still somebody's whole wallet.

    An old approval can be enough. If a wallet once granted an unlimited approval to an address that is now hostile, that spender can call transferFrom without any new request. Token approvals don't expire on their own. The trap can be set months before anyone springs it.

    The kit author sells you the gun. The franchisee pulls the trigger. And somehow, you're the one signing the consent form.

    Vocabulary Decoded: The Drainer Dictionary

    These terms are real Ethereum infrastructure — weaponized by operators who understood that nobody reads what they sign. The complexity is the camouflage:

    "Airdrop Claim" / "Token Distribution"

    What it sounds like:

    A free token giveaway from a legitimate project rewarding early users — Arbitrum, Optimism and LayerZero all ran airdrops. Standard DeFi marketing.

    What actually happens on a fake page:

    Illustrative example — not a verified on-chain indicator: the page asks you to 'claim' your allocation. The button triggers a wallet signature. To you it says 'Approve LXR'. To the contract it says 'Approve operator wallet 0xC0FF...EE99 to spend unlimited USDC, USDT, and ETH'. You don't claim anything. You authorize someone else to claim everything you own. The 'Claim' button is the gun. Your signature is the trigger.

    "permit2" / "setApprovalForAll"

    What it sounds like:

    Gas-efficient Ethereum standards that let dApps batch approvals so you don't have to sign one transaction per token. Uniswap, 1inch, and OpenSea all use them legitimately.

    How drainer kits weaponize them:

    Permit2 lets one off-chain signature set an allowance with an amount and an expiration written into the signed message; the spender can pull tokens until the allowance runs out or expires. A drainer picks a huge amount and a distant expiration. setApprovalForAll hands an operator every NFT in a collection. The bot doesn't need you online after you sign. You signed a blank cheque with no sensible end date. Nobody revokes it for you.

    "Drainer Kit" / "Phishing-as-a-Service"

    What it sounds like:

    Generic developer slang. Could be anything from a npm package to an internal Discord bot.

    What's actually being sold in Telegram:

    A software package: phishing page templates, drainer code and a customer panel with victim statistics. Group-IB found Inferno Drainer's developers took 20% of stolen assets, and in some cases 30% when they also hosted the phishing site. It's SaaS, with theft as the feature.

    "Spender" / "Approved Address"

    What it sounds like:

    A field in your wallet's signature popup. Most users glance at it once and never again.

    Why it's the only field that matters:

    Real claims usually call the project's own contract, listed in its official docs. A drainer request names a spender you can't match to the project. Read the spender, check it on a block explorer, and reject if it doesn't match. The spender field is the warning label. Skip it and the gun is already loaded.

    Every term above is real Ethereum plumbing. Every one of them got turned into a weapon by people who knew you wouldn't read what you sign.

    How a Drainer Kit Operation Runs: The Five-Stage Factory

    The stages below are a composite drawn from published drainer research, not one documented operation. Here's the assembly line:

    Stage 1: The Vendor Ships the Kit

    The developer builds the drainer and a panel, copies the look of known protocols and advertises the service. Inferno Drainer used a Telegram channel. Most of the effort goes into the panel. Operators don't rent ugly software.

    Group-IB found the customer panel still live in the first week of December 2023, after the announced shutdown. Retirement, drainer style.

    Stage 2: The Franchisee Buys In

    An operator plugs in a receiving address and brings traffic. The developer's cut comes off the top. They don't need to write a smart contract. The vendor already did.

    Inferno Drainer's split was 20/80. When the developers also hosted the phishing site, Group-IB saw them take 30%. Name a franchise where head office takes a fifth and never meets a customer.

    Stage 3: The Bait Goes Live

    The operator pushes the page through ads, replies, DMs and hijacked accounts, with 'claim' or 'airdrop' next to a real project's logo. Illustrative domains, not verified indicators: linea-claim[.]invalid, claim-airdrop[.]invalid.

    The feed where people discover new projects is the same feed where fake claims get posted.

    Stage 4: The Approval Trap

    You connect to 'check eligibility'. The page reads public data from your address and shows a personal-looking allocation with a countdown. You click Claim. The wallet asks for a Permit, Permit2 or approve signature. The illustrative spender 0xC0FF...EE99 is not the project's contract. You sign. The drainer is already loaded.

    Reading your address history is a public call any page can make. A personal number proves only that the page can read a block explorer.

    Stage 5: The Sweep & The Laundry

    A backend calls transferFrom for the approved tokens and moves them on: swaps, bridges, fresh addresses. Stablecoin issuers can sometimes freeze funds before they move further. By the time you notice, the money may have changed chains.

    A freeze depends on where the money sits and how fast someone reports it. We know of no reliable recovery rate to quote.

    How You Get Drained in 5 Steps

    This is what a fake-airdrop operation looks like end-to-end. Every step is automated except the one you do.

    1.

    FAKE CLAIM POST

    A post, ad or DM promises a 'claim' from a project you've heard of

    2.

    TYPOSQUAT LANDING PAGE

    Cloned UI, fake eligibility check, personalized token amount, countdown timer

    3.

    PERMIT2 SIGNATURE REQUEST

    Spender = drainer address. Amount = as much as possible. Expiry = far away

    4.

    transferFrom FIRES

    The backend pulls every approved token, often soon after the signature

    5.

    MIXER → BRIDGE → TRON OTC

    Funds swapped, bridged and split. Operator keeps most; kit author takes a cut

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    Myths That Get You Drained

    If you believe any of these, you're the target market. Drainer operators count on these myths the way casinos count on maths.

    Myth

    Real airdrops always come to you on X first.

    Fact

    Fake claim posts use verified-looking accounts and paid placement. A trusted spot on the feed is exactly why they buy it.

    Myth

    My wallet warns me about malicious sites.

    Fact

    Warnings and blocklists catch known drainer sites and contracts. A new domain or a freshly deployed contract may not be listed yet.

    Myth

    If the page loads my wallet info correctly, it's legitimate.

    Fact

    Reading on-chain data is a public call. Any page can read your history and personalise a fake eligibility result. That's a marketing trick, not validation.

    Myth

    Permit2 is just a gas-saving feature, so it's safe to sign.

    Fact

    Permit2 sets an allowance with the amount and expiration you sign. Uniswap uses it legitimately. Drainers use the same signature with a huge amount and a distant expiry.

    Myth

    I'd notice immediately if my wallet got drained.

    Fact

    Not always. Some drains happen right after the signature; an approval can also sit unused until a bigger balance arrives.

    Every myth above was believed by someone who lost money. The drainer kit business model requires you to believe at least one. They don't need all the myths. They just need yours.

    Why Experienced Users Still Click 'Approve'

    We found no verified victim profile for fake airdrops. These reasons come from how claim pages and wallet prompts are designed:

    Approval Fatigue

    Active DeFi users sign approvals often. The next request looks like the last one, except this one goes to a drainer. Familiarity isn't safety. It's the operator's favourite weapon.

    Pixel-Perfect Cloning

    Fake pages copy the real project's look, often closely. The difference that matters is the contract address in the wallet popup, which many users skip.

    Manufactured Urgency

    Every fake page has a countdown timer ('Claim by midnight'), a fake 'eligibility expires' banner, and a personalized token amount based on your wallet history. The whole UX is engineered to bypass deliberation. Urgency is the enemy of verification.

    Trust Inheritance

    Victims arrive via X ads (trusted), Discord pins (trusted), or Google search (trusted). The trust signal of the entry point gets transferred to the destination. The platform did the credibility work. The drainer just collected the rent.

    The best phishing doesn't look like phishing. It looks like the next claim button you've signed 50 times before.

    After the Drain: The Recovery Vultures

    You just lost money to a signature. You're refreshing a block explorer at 3 AM and searching 'how to recover stolen crypto'. That search is where the second wave finds you:

    The 'Asset Recovery Specialist' DM

    Within hours you may get DMs from accounts named like 'CryptoRecovery_Verified'. They claim partnerships with analytics firms, show a dashboard 'tracing' your funds and ask for an upfront fee to 'unlock' them. The only thing they unlock is a second loss. They're not recovering anything. They're charging a fee for being robbed twice.

    The Fake FBI / Tether Compliance Call

    A call from a spoofed FBI number, or a 'Tether Compliance Officer' asking you to verify your identity by entering your seed phrase in a 'secure portal'. Real agencies and stablecoin issuers won't ask for your seed phrase, wallet access or a 'verification fee'. In the U.S., follow up through your own IC3 complaint, not through whoever called you. The only thing they're investigating is how much more you'll send.

    The 'Smart Contract Reversal' Discord Bot

    A Discord bot named 'PermitRevoke_Bot' or 'FlashbotReverse' DMs you offering to 'reverse' the malicious transaction by 'front-running it on Flashbots'. Transactions cannot be reversed. That's the whole point of blockchain. The bot leads to a phishing site that asks you to sign another permit2 — to drain whatever the first drainer missed. The vultures aren't even original. They're using the same playbook to clean up the leftovers.

    THE GOLDEN RULE: Nobody who contacts YOU about recovering YOUR stolen funds is legitimate. Real recovery happens through complaints YOU file (IC3, Chainabuse, ScamSniffer). If they found you — they're hunting you. The difference between a rescuer and a predator? The predator always arrives first.

    You lost money once to a bot that doesn't know your name. Don't lose it twice to a human who does. The first theft was automated. The second one is personal.

    Protection: 5 Habits That Make You Drainer-Proof

    You can't outrun a drainer kit. But you can refuse to sign the form.

    • Verify every airdrop URL through the project's official X or Discord — never click ads. Real airdrops are announced on the project's verified accounts and official website. If you saw the claim in an ad, a DM or a search result, treat it as fake until those official channels confirm it. Bookmarks beat search. Search beats ads.
    • Read every wallet signature. If you see 'permit2', 'setApprovalForAll', or 'approve(unlimited)' — reject by default. Most wallets now decode signature requests. Look for the method name and the spender. A real claim uses methods that send *you* tokens, not methods that give *them* access to *your* tokens. If the spender isn't the project's published contract, reject.
    • Use Rabby Wallet with revoke.cash bookmarked — audit approvals on the 1st of every month. Rabby simulates a transaction and shows the expected balance change before you sign. Revoke.cash and Etherscan's Token Approval Checker list active approvals and let you revoke them. Check once a month.
    • Hold airdrop-eligible activity in a dedicated farming wallet with zero stablecoin balance. Create a separate wallet for airdrop farming and DeFi exploration. Keep zero stablecoins, zero ETH beyond gas, and zero NFTs. If you sign a malicious contract there, the drainer gets nothing — there's nothing to drain. Move tokens to your main vault wallet only after verifying every interaction. Compartmentalization beats bravery.
    • Check claim domains with a phishing-protection extension before connecting. Extensions such as ScamSniffer warn about known malicious sites and contracts. They can miss a domain nobody has reported yet, so they back up reading the signature; they don't replace it.

    Defenses Worth Installing

    Here's what each tool does and what it doesn't, because overselling a defense is almost as dangerous as having none:

    Rabby Wallet (free)

    Rabby simulates a transaction before you sign and shows which tokens would leave the wallet. Against drainers that's one of the clearest warnings you can get. The wallet that reads the contract for you is worth its weight in unsigned approvals.

    revoke.cash + Bulk Revoke

    Free, no custody. Lists the active approvals on your wallet across many chains and lets you revoke them; each revoke is an on-chain transaction that costs gas. The drainer can only fire transferFrom while the approval exists.

    ScamSniffer (browser extension)

    Warns about known drainer domains and malicious contracts. It can't flag a page nobody has reported yet, so a missing warning means no information, not safe.

    Hardware Wallet + Clear Signing

    A hardware wallet with clear signing shows the transaction details, including the spender, on the device screen before you confirm. Reading a long address on a small screen is annoying. It's also the step that catches a swapped spender. Clear signing is friction. Friction is the only thing that beats muscle memory.

    Dedicated Farming Wallet

    Free. Built into every wallet. Create a second account, send only enough ETH for gas, and use it for every experimental airdrop or new-protocol claim. If a drainer hits, the loss is gas dust. Your main vault stays untouched. The best defense in DeFi is the one that costs zero dollars and zero dependencies.

    No single tool stops drainer kits. The attack exploits your habits, not your software. Tools help. Habits save. Reading the spender field takes seconds.

    Your Anti-Drainer Pre-Sign Checklist

    Tape this to your monitor. Read it before every airdrop claim:

    1.

    Did I find this airdrop on the project's verified accounts or official website, not an ad, DM or search result?

    2.

    Does the URL match the project's official domain *exactly* (no typosquats, no extra characters)?

    3.

    Did I check the domain with a phishing-protection tool before connecting my wallet?

    4.

    Is the wallet I'm using a dedicated farming wallet with no stablecoin balance?

    5.

    Does my signature request send tokens to me, rather than ask for Permit, Permit2, approve or setApprovalForAll?

    6.

    Is the spender the project's published contract, checked on a block explorer?

    7.

    Did I check Revoke.cash or Etherscan for forgotten approvals before signing this one?

    8.

    If this drains me right now, is the maximum loss something I can afford?

    Got a Suspicious Message?

    Use our AI-powered detector to analyze potential scams instantly.

    Key Takeaways

    1. 1.A fake airdrop page asks for an approval or Permit signature, not a claim. That signature is the theft.
    2. 2.Drainer kits are rented: Inferno Drainer's developers took 20% of stolen assets and operators kept 80% (Group-IB).
    3. 3.ScamSniffer counted $83.85M in signature-phishing losses across 106,106 victims in 2025, a total for all signature phishing, not airdrops alone.
    4. 4.The trap is the signature, not the website. Read the spender field before every approval.
    5. 5.Permit2 and setApprovalForAll grant standing access until it expires or you revoke it. Audit approvals monthly.
    6. 6.Use a dedicated farming wallet, a transaction simulator and a hardware wallet with clear signing.

    “The 'Claim' button doesn't claim anything for you.”

    It claims everything from you.

    Frequently Asked Questions

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    Sources & Citations

    Research for this investigation compiled from publicly available blockchain data, security reports, and community documentation.

    [1]
    Group-IB: Inferno Drainer scam-as-a-service investigation

    www.group-ib.com · Date not published or not verified

    www.group-ib.com · Date not published or not verified

    [2]
    ScamSniffer: 2025 crypto phishing report ($83.85M across 106,106 victims)index page

    drops.scamsniffer.io · Date not published or not verified

    index page

    drops.scamsniffer.io · Date not published or not verified

    [3]
    Uniswap Docs: Permit2 overview (allowances, amounts and expiration)

    docs.uniswap.org · Date not published or not verified

    docs.uniswap.org · Date not published or not verified

    [4]
    ethereum.org: ERC-20 token standard (approve and transferFrom)

    ethereum.org · Date not published or not verified

    ethereum.org · Date not published or not verified

    [5]
    Etherscan: Token Approval Checkerindex page

    etherscan.io · Date not published or not verified

    index page

    etherscan.io · Date not published or not verified

    [6]
    Home Page - Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3)index page

    www.ic3.gov · Date not published or not verified

    index page

    www.ic3.gov · Date not published or not verified

    Verification: All blockchain transactions and addresses referenced in this article can be independently verified through the linked blockchain explorers. We encourage readers to conduct their own verification.

    Methodology: Every case needs at least two independent sources before publication, plus verifiable on-chain evidence whenever a public transaction trail exists. Full standards: /methodology

    Legal notice: This assessment is based on publicly available data, including on-chain records, official statements and reported incidents. It is journalistic and educational analysis, not legal advice, an accusation of criminal conduct or a court finding. Named companies, projects, domains, wallets and individuals are described as reported by the cited sources; a company name may appear because fraudsters impersonated it, not because the company did anything wrong. If you believe something is inaccurate or out of date, write to cryptostrapon@pm.me and we will correct it and log the change. Editorial policy